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INT[RNATIONAl
20 A Policy of Change
By Peter Jay
We in. the West have showed ourselves
remarkably inept on occasions in seem-
ing to support leaders and govemments
abroad who not only run their countries on
the basis of principles and methods that
were in total contrast with our own demo-
cratic beliefs, but whose regimes were
also doomed in the end to catastrophic
failure ..Apart from the purely moral con-
siderations of such a stance on the part of
the West, it was a disaster as a practical
policy.
What Britain is trying to achieve in
Southem Africa is of special importance
to my generation. Having tumed 41, I can
no longer think of myself as young. But I
did grow up at a stage in the history of my
country, and with my contemporaries in a
certain mood, when we could throw off the
intemational complacency, the imperial
nostalg ia and the moral insensitivity of the
past We recognized that the systematic
and unashamed oppression of one race
by another was morally indefensible; and
its erection into the avowed creed of
apartheid made it doubly offensive. We
also recognized the accelerating pace of
change in the world, together with its in-
creasing complexity, to understand the in-
terlocking nature of the global community
and the often explosive interaction of
events great distances apart.
Motives of pure self-interest and acqui-
sitiveness, on the part of the more power-
ful nations, were out of place and indeed
dangerous. There were-and still are-
those who are inclined to channel the
course of events into chaos, from which
they believe their own power will benefit.
And there are those, in contrast, who wish
to ensure that change in each part of the
globe should be for the good of its inhab-
itants and with their co-operation and
choice.
This second philosophy may seem de-
fensive; but it is in fact grounded in re-
spect for human rights, particularly the
right of self-determination, and in the wish'
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- lain peace. The policy of theWest-
ers in Southern Africa, where hu-
rights are continuously violated,
- - e peace has been shattered and
e threat of super-power conflict
~ darkly, is an exarnple of that radical
osophy at work.
- is radical, because not so long ago
- -=.-determination was not a much re-
principle in international affairs,
the imperial age was in full swing
= a greater proportion of theworld than
=- ~ ryprevious time was subject territory.
:::'~in, of course, was stronger in Africa
any other nation. The last three dec-
=-- ,however, have seen a remarkable
~ formation. Over a period of a very few
a large number of new nations were
Certainly there was bitterness and
- t in many instances, and there was
reluctance in the colonizing coun-
o let go what they thought of as
~o;.... erritories."
3ritain's case, order was established
- --=conflict, and colonial possessive-
/as rejected as a policy. Britain
= ied to ensure that in each new na-
oo vacuum was left for any other
with a taste for acquistion-for irn-
ism is still alive in certain quarters
-II at their leisure. Self-determination,
panied by positive preparation for
- "'-;Jovernment,was the key- not just as
_ sounding principle, but as a realis-
=.. practicable goal.
granting of independence to India
7 by Britain's labor government was
- critical turning point in British atti-
- ces. It was the first, as well as the bold-
and largest, example of a new philos-
at work. Socialists have always
led imperialism and colonialism on
iple. It was, therefore, natural and in-
- ble-despite the daunting problems
e transition-that the first labor gov-
ent with a clear majority in Parlia-
-- t should have given the highest pri-
to setting the Indian sub-continent
lean Independence
- frica, the winds of change blew later,
more haphazardly, and with unmistake-
able strength. In most areas, Britain was
ableto prepare the colonies for independ-
ence more thoroughly and efficiently than
was the case with India. The fact that this
mainly occurred under conservative gov-
ernments in Britain showed also howdeep
was the change of heart by this time.
On the whole, the transition was re-
markably successful. In virtually every in-
stance, the newly independent country
was willing to join the Commonwealth of
Nations (an association of states which
had previously been British dominions or
colonies). It is, outwardly, a curious group-
ing of countries now numbering 35, con-
sisting of developed industrial countries
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and Britain herself; developing producer
countries such as Nigeria; developing
consumer countries with large popula-
tions, such as India, Bangladesh, Kenya,
Tanzania and Zambia; and other smaller
nations without known resources. There
are no exclusive or special political or
even economic ties among the members
of the Commonwealth. Nontheless, they
share something of a culture and some-
thing of a language, even if in some cases
these may be secondary; and they meet
regularly to talk about the problems of the
world, mostly in the area of North-South
relations, the relationship between the
richest and poorest countries of the world.
The Commonwealth has proved a highly
fertile and constructive body, sharing in a
spirit of equality, mutual respect and un-
derstanding a frank and a positive attitude
to problems that more formal interna-
tional institutions cannot always achieve.
Most importantly, it cuts across political,
ideological, geographical, religious, eth-
nic and economic barriers which nowa-
days threaten to divide the world into mu-
tually hostile and' non-comprehending
blocs. This general success in making
the transition from empire to a free Com-
monwealth has, so far, escaped us in our
dealings with Rhodesia and South Africa.
Majority Rule in Rhodesia
There is a history here of impotence and
failure. Rhodesia was never governed by
Britain when it first came under the British
crown in 1923. It was given the status
of a self-governing colony. And after
years of pressure from successive gov-
ernments in Britain on the white minority
government to move decisively toward
Black majority rule, Ian Smith unilaterally
declared an illegal independence in
1965. In spite of repeated efforts by gov-
ernmentsof both parties in Britain to press
their policy, which included asking the
United Nations for a mandate of sanctions
against Rhodesia, Smith remained too
blind-and Britain quite frankly too weak
-for majority rule to be established in
Rhodesia.
Smith thought he had achieved the
stalemate he wanted. But in 1976 Henry
Kissinger, then U.S. secretary of state,
who had been alerted to the potential
dangers of conflict in Africa by the civil
war in Angola, directed his powers to the
case of Rhodesia. It was Kissinger who
achieved what no one else had managed
to do. He secured a commitment from
Smith- in the broadest terms-to work to-
ward majority-rule for Rhodesia.When the
Carter Administration took over in Wash-
ington, and David Owen became Britain's
foreign secretary, it was decided, even.
though it seemed as though Kissinger's
efforts had come to nothing, to make one
more all-out effort to bring the white mi-
nority in Rhodesia to their senses and thus
prevent the situation there from collaps-
ing into uncontrollable turmoil and blood-
shed.
The ground of the previous decade was
littered with the bones of their predeces-
sors' attempts; but it was quite clear that
there was going to be change in Southern
Africa and it was a choice between nat-
ure's brutal remedies and the possibility
of a saner man-made transition. Secretary
Owen's decision to give it one last try, and
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's and UN.
Ambassador Andrew Young's simultane-
ous determination to commit the U.S. in a
21
22 new interest in Africa, and to human rights
as a principle in foreign policy, demon-
strated high moral and political courage.
The Anglo-American Plan
What we are not trying to do in Rhodesia
is to choose a leader for an independent
Zimbabwe. In formulating a joint policy,
what has now come to be known as the
Anglo-American Proposals, the British
and American govemments have chosen
the high ground of principle, avoiding the
temptations that previous governrnents
found too often irresistible in other trou-
bled areas of picking the man who might
appear the most malleable or Western-
oriented.
The objectives of the Anglo-American
plan are basically threefold: independ-
ence for Zimbabwe by the end of 1978,
the election of a new government on the
principle of one-man one-vote, and the
creation of conditions of law and order in
which all candidates can present their
policies and the electorate can choose
freely without fear. In order to achieve
these objectives, first there must be an
abatement of the civil war. Also, we must
strive for a ceasefire. Talks with all the
parties concerned, as well as with those
who influence and support them, are es-
sential. This has been our determined
strategy from the beginning.
During the course of 1977, we failed to
persuade the leaders of the Patriotic Front
(Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) to
accept our proposals, some essential fea-
tures of which they found objectionable.
Now, however, following an active period
in which the presidents of the states on
the front line of the fighting-Zambia, Mo-
zambique, Tanzania and Botswana-have
made their own assessment of the situa-
tion and have shared their conclusion with
the Patriotic Front leaders, they are said
to be inclined to accept our proposals, at
least as a basis for future talks with Brit-
ain and the United States. In the mean-
time, events have moved on and Smith
has produced an agreement signed in
March with three of the Black leaders
within Rhodesia-BishopAbel Muzorewa,
the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief
Jeremiah Chirau-which has become
known as the "Internal Settlement." This
has made it operationally necessary to
adjust our own tactics for bringing about
a majority rule in Zimbabwe.
Previously, the mechanism for pressing
Smith to let drop the reins of government,
once a successor government was in
place, depended on lining up a solid front
of the nationalist leaders and the front
line states. This would have confronted
South Africa as well as Smith with an or-
derly transition to majority rule-an offer
they could not refuse. The alternative
would have been a civil war, with all the
attendant instability, economic destruc-
tion and bloodshed. The situation now is
more complicated-even if the South
African government and Smith recogn ized
some objective considerations, it is po-
litically more difficult for them to respond
now that Muzorewa and Sithole have ac-
cepted the so-called internal settlement.
The South African government is an-
swerable to its own white electorate,
which creates its own political pressures;
and white public opinion there is strongly
of the view that Smith has done enough to
fulfill his commitment to majority rule to
earn their support.
On our part, we regard the internal settle-
ment as grossly inadequate, and the re-
sulting Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole govern-
ment just as illegal as the previous Smith
regime. But, while the Salisbury agree-
ment has in no way changed our objec-
tives, it inevitably effects our tactics.
Hence the recent series of meetings in
Africa involving Secretaries Vance and
Owen and Ambassador Young. All parties
have to be convinced that the Anglo-
American proposals, or something close
to them, hold the middle ground. The is-
sue is enormously tough, and success is
by no means assured. But that is no rea-
son not to try. The fact that we have
brought the matter this far should be evi-
dence enough that we are determined to
see it through to the end. It is in the inter-
est of none of the parties to let that part of
the continent relapse into chaos anc
bloodshed.
Simultaneous with all this frenzied ac-
tivity over Rhodesia has been the involve-
ment of Western powers in the future -
South-West Africa, or Namibia. Here, the
issue is simpler for the West than Hho-
desia or South Africa, because the basic
conflict happens to involve only two
rather than several parties. But we shall
continue to keep the Namibian issue alive,
It could well be that success in Namibia
will ease the way considerably toward a
settlement of the Rhodesian problem, b&-
cause it will show that negotiation and
patience can succeed faster than guns
and bloodshed in returning to the African
people their birthright of independence
and self-government.
South Africa
Here, the risks of violence and- in time
-of outside exploitation are danger-
ously high. The humiliations engendered
by institutionalized racialism, rationalized
under the vile hypocrisy of apartheid, will
inevitably drive people in increasing num-
bers to desperate action. For a long time
now South Africans have been made man-
ifestly aware of the disgust and contempt
of world op in ion for thei r system of oppres-
sion of the African majority by the white
minority. What we have long hoped for,
and continue to look forward to, is evolu-
tionary change within South Africa that wi II
lead - under the pressures that the out-
side world can extend - to the granting of
full democratic and human rights to all
the inhabitants of the country, without the
loss of the partly developed infrastructure
and economic buoyancy that the country
already enjoys.
Indeed, we have to exercise care when
dealing with the paranoid personality of
white racism so that we do not provoke a
mental ity of such total isolation from world
opinions and principles of human rights
that the regime retreats even further from
recognition of the inevitability of Black
emancipation and eventual majority rule.
We have to avoid a situation in which
South Africans drive themselves into
- I fortress from wh ich they wi II be
- 3 to escape. Isolation feeds itself
- eeds a sense of unreality and a
contempt for outside opinions,
_ case of Rhodesia has already dem-
~ed. So we believe that closing
:;~tally on South Africa is the equiva-
=- == giving up hope for change without
_ bath.
the course of 1977, there were
at at least certain elements of
- South African opinion were begin-
see the logic of evolutionary
. There was some movement to-
a dialogue with other African states
::;. toward partial integration in sport.
appearance of progress was, how-
• quickly shattered by the mysterious
s in prison of pol itical detainees.
death of Steve Biko was an appalling
inder of the intransigence and bl ind-
of the South African authorities.
iko was one of the most prominent of
=. '"M'!W generation of South Africans who
-srnand the early dismantling of apart-
- • but without recourse to violence,
:=.. who are willing to suffer for their be-
- . His death was followed by further
ssive measures, including the ban-
of citizens and organizations and the
re of newspapers. The silencing of
who speak for the majority in South
-::ica was a tragic step backwards, which
es it all the more difficult to advocate
ceful and principled transformation.
nwritinq about Britain's wish for change
South Africa, it is essential to note that
land's trade with, and investment in
Africa, represent a huge stake in or-
change. But then that coincides with
-0 interest of South Africa's Black citizens
will suffer terribly if violence becomes
only route to decency and majority
. Our trade with the rest of Africa is
=0 ing fast, too, and exports are now as
~t as those to South Africa. Nigeria, for
~ple, is now our biggest trading part-
on the continent. But to put a complete
to our trade with South Africa would
-I cause major problems for the British
industry and gravely dislocate our econ-
omy, as well as cause bitter privations to
Black workers in South Africa.
This situation will not Change overnight.
In fact, it underlines the seriousness of the
British government's commitment to evo-
lutionary change in South Africa toward a
system based on internationally accepta-
ble principles. We are ready to use every
bit of political and economic influence at
our disposal to urge peaceful change
there. We have, for more than 13 years, ob-
served a voluntary arms embargo, and do
not cooperate in the nuclear field. We have
persuaded the nine countries of the Euro-
pean Economic Community to observe a
code of business conduct in South Africa,
one of the main purposes of which is to
encourage the growth of free, non-dis-
criminatory trade unionism and the equal
treatment of workers irrespective of race.
We will maintain and strengthen our
utter condemnation of apartheid, a sys-
tem repugnant to the values we hold dear.
But we continue to bel ieve that we shou Id
try to communicate with South Atrica.and
all South Africans. Only in this way can we
hope to impress on the white community
there the imperative need for early and
far-reaching changes.
We shall continue to insistthat the South
African government must begin to take
serious steps to dismantle apartheid, in
the recognition that, if we do not, not only
will the risks of explosion grow and our
own credibility in Africa be undermined,
but also human rights will continue to be
denied in the most ruthless manner. D
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Peter Jay is the British ambassador to the
United States.
